Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED
JUL 2008		**00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
A New Grand Strategy for the United States	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **Rand Corporation,1776 Main Street,PO Box 2138,Santa Monica,CA,90407-2138**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**Same as Report (SAR)**	**21**	

TESTIMONY

A New Grand Strategy for the United States

ROBERT E. HUNTER

CT-313

July 2008

Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on July 31, 2008

Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation
1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665
RAND URL: http://www.rand.org
To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact
Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;
Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

Ambassador Robert E. Hunter[1]
Ambassador to NATO 1993-1998
Senior Advisor
The RAND Corporation

A New Grand Strategy for the United States[2]

Before the Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
United States House of Representatives

July 31, 2008

Mr. Chairman: It is an honor to appear before you and this subcommittee this morning. Let me start by first commending you for your wisdom and leadership in holding this series of hearings on "a new grand strategy for the United States." As Lewis Carroll, creator of Alice in Wonderland, said, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there." What you are doing here will help us to determine where we as a nation should be going, as the essential first step before trying to determine what "road" will take us there. And this is none too soon. It is now more than a decade and a half since the end of the Cold War – a time when we had a clear understanding of US grand strategy; nearly seven years since the tragic events of 9/11 fundamentally altered our perception of threats posed to our nation; and more than five years since the US-led Coalition invasion of Iraq. Yet, certainly for the Middle East and indeed for engagements in other parts of the world, we have yet to decide upon an overall set of ideas and directions to guide our way forward in these extraordinarily complex and challenging times. In short, we lack a grand strategy.

It is often said that "geography is destiny." For the United States during most of our history, we were able to shelter behind the barrier provided by two broad oceans. If we became deeply engaged aboard, as we did in World War I, it was because we understood that there were limits to the basic proposition that geography was security. We intervened militarily in Europe then because we understood that our economy and ultimately our way of life depended on preventing the domination of Europe by a hostile nation with hegemonic ambitions. But after that conflict we largely retreated again behind our great ocean barriers. The Second World War and especially the shock of Pearl Harbor forced us to understand the limits of our ocean fastness. Again, we opposed the ambitions of hostile nations with hegemonic ambitions, one in Europe and one in Asia. But this time, the post-war era did not permit us to retreat once again. Rather, in our own self interest –

---

[1] The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
[2] This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT313/.

economics, security, values – we became permanently engaged in the destiny of Europe, as a lasting “European power,” to oppose the ambitions to hegemony of another hostile power, the Soviet Union, and its alien ideology, communism, in time joined by Communist China.

US grand strategy during that era was direct, clear, and simple. It was dominated by three basic propositions: to contain the Soviet Union, its allies and its acolytes; to confound communism; and – both to help achieve those twin goals and for its own value -- to lead a growing, global free-world economy. Along with friends and allies abroad, we succeeded. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet external and internal empires from 1989 to 1991 represented the most massive retreat of any nation or empire in all of peacetime history.

Following the Cold War, we found that two of the three great propositions, or paradigms, had been superseded. We still had responsibility, in our own and others’ self-interest, for leading a growing, global economy. We were by then so deeply engaged around the world, had so developed both a habit and an aptitude for leadership, and had, more than any other nation, so come to be seen by most of the world as a beacon of hope and aspiration and champion of basic human rights and freedoms that we were impressed upon to remain engaged in the outside world. We did not retreat, although after initial work to wrap up the remains of the Cold War – marked by President George H.W. Bush’s historic and unprecedented ambition to create a “Europe whole and free and at peace” and President Bill Clinton’s modernization of NATO to close the book on 20th century European security and open up possibilities for the 21st – we did enter what I call a “holiday from history.” This was a time when we were relatively less engaged, less ambitious to lead, in general less innovative, though of course we did not abstain from all responsibilities and could see other challenges emerging in various parts of the globe, both geographic and functional.

With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet empires and European communism, we regained most of what had proved historically of such inestimable value: the relative security provided by two broad oceans. No country was both able and willing to assault us in the homeland; and we found we had accumulated an astounding amount of at least incipient power – a combination of military, economic, political, social, and cultural power and influence in the world that has had no rival since at least the end of the Roman Empire. We thus found ourselves with a range of freedom of choice about what to do and what not to do in the world that we had not enjoyed since before Pearl Harbor and that few nations have enjoyed at any time in their histories.

That era came to an end on September 11, 2001. We learned not just that we could be assaulted by enemies in the homeland, literally out of the blue and in a way that had a profound psychological shock on our sense of security and well-being, but that to counter these enemies we once again had to become deeply engaged in adapting our instruments of power and influence to act abroad in

our own self-interest and that of friends and allies. The US response was of extraordinary quality, especially in the prompt reduction of the base in Afghanistan for terrorism projected against the United States. Our leaders deserve great credit, and the serving men and women of our armed forces, along with personnel from other branches of government, did the Nation great credit. Indeed, what this committee and the Congress in general had done to help develop the critical military and other capabilities stood us in good stead at that incredibly difficult and challenging time.

Today, it is hard to imagine that there will again be a time of US retreat from the outside world, in our own self-interest, or even a relative reduction in our engagement, in one form or another. Pearl Harbor ended America's isolation; 9/11 ended any remaining elements of insulation. We are now a fully and in all likelihood permanently engaged power and people in the outside world and we have no choice but to be so engaged -- and to get it right.

We now face a variety of challenges, both old and new, as well as a variety of opportunities to help shape conditions and events that will work both for us and for others. This will be a complex as well as difficult effort. Also, unlike the Cold War, unless we someday face the emergence of another hostile center of power with hegemonic ambitions and capabilities to pursue them, we will not again find ourselves with a simple set of propositions or paradigms. In essence, we have a "paradigm gap;" and we recognize that the nature of international politics is now more "normal" in history as opposed to the abnormality of having two great superpowers locked in struggle and thus dominating much of the politics of the rest of the world.

At the same time, despite the complexity of the tasks we face, most of which have been, as in historic experience, thrust upon us from outside, the dangers of the times we face should not be exaggerated. Even at the extreme of the threat of terrorism, we do not now face the kind and degree of threat that was characterized by the Cold War, when two nations held the capacity to destroy life on this planet, a time whose end can safely be called the most fortuitous development in history in terms of moving the world beyond such a parlous set of risks. Dangers today, yes; challenges, yes; great responsibilities, yes; threats to the survival of the human race, decidedly not.

What, then, do we face today and tomorrow, and how do we structure our thinking and our acting to meet the threats, challenges, and opportunities that we are likely to face in the years ahead?

Mr. Chairman, against that background, let me advance a few basic propositions regarding a new grand strategy for the United States. Some are about interests; some are about process.

In summary, I believe there are seven basic requirements: Strategic Thinking, Strength at Home, Assessing Tasks and Priorities, Tools, Allies and Partners, Leadership, and Popular Support. And

there are three basic techniques that can be of great benefit: Force Multipliers, Power and Influence Multipliers, and Security Multipliers.

One: Strategic Thinking

Number one lies in just what you are doing with these hearings. After the end of the Cold War, we "stood down" not just in many of the instruments of US power and influence and how and where they were deployed, we also "stood down" in much of our capacity for strategic thought, thought that could produce an intelligent, appropriate, and sustainable grand strategy. Renewing the capacity for strategic thought, such as was so marked during World War II and the Cold War, has to be a key priority. It also has to be a key priority for the new administration that will be inaugurated next January 20 and in the Congress. The president's team must include top-flight people able to "think strategically" to a degree we have not seen since the early days of the Cold War.

There must be comparable efforts here in the Congress. What you are doing here today is part of that process, and I join in saluting you for it. I urge you to hold similar hearings on a regular basis and also, as you judge appropriate, to hold joint hearings with the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Indeed, while Congress authorizes and appropriates in a particular fashion, I believe it is important that some committees, perhaps with this one taking the lead or with special National Security Oversight committees in the two houses, take a clear-sighted look, on a regular and systematic basis, at the overarching grand strategy for the Nation and the various policies and instrumentalities needed, on an integrated basis, to pursue that grand strategy.

Two: Strength at Home

Number two lies in what we do in our own society. Security does not just begin at home; it fundamentally is about "home." It is not just the pursuit of the traditional American grand strategic goal and practice of meeting threats and challenges abroad, as far away from the American homeland as possible – a strategic luxury enjoyed by no other great power in the world. It is also about what we do at home to secure the homeland – indeed, "homeland security" has to be a first charge on our grand strategy and national security; and that includes having control over our own frontiers.

But there is also more. If we are to provide for our security in the world, if we are to pursue security "properly understood," which includes the promotion of American prosperity, then we have to prepare the instruments at home that will help us succeed abroad. This includes renewal and advance in the sinews of the US economy and polity – the most fundamental basis for power and

influence in the outside world: the education and health of our people, renewal of infrastructure, investments in the future of our economy, stability in our financial system, reduction of dependence on imported oil, productive trade policies, and the confidence of our people in our political and social systems and the leadership of our nation. And we need to understand that the face of America abroad, indeed, a “legion of informal ambassadors,” will often be not representatives of the US government, civilian and military, but people involved in the private sector – the greatest engine we have of US engagement abroad – those who devote themselves to service in non-governmental organizations, and individual Americans who go abroad as students, teachers, and tourists.

With the end of the Cold War paradigms and the reemergence of a more complex and dynamic world in which the US will be totally immersed, we also face an added challenge to ramp up understanding of other nations and cultures and their languages to a degree we have not seen before. This includes major efforts to gain a proper understanding of the nature of Islam and its more than one billion adherents. We have, indeed, made significant progress since 9/11, but we still have far to go, beginning in the US educational system and extending through training in all of the US combat arms and other elements of government that could be involved in conflict and other forms of projecting American power and influence in the Muslim world. Each element of the US government that will deploy its personnel abroad needs a reserve of trained specialists with a capacity to deal effectively in other cultures. We should not again see a situation like that of one American battalion commander with responsibilities for security in a major part of Baghdad who had to rely for translation on a rifleman-reservist from his home state who hailed from Egypt and thus could speak Arabic.

This requirement for strength at home also includes preservation and development of qualities of American life that have historically provided a beacon to others, that have gained us extraordinary influence to build partnerships and friendships and to shape events, the American reputation for promoting democracy, civil liberties, and the advance of civil rights, human rights, and poverty reduction. Some may find hackneyed the concept of our being what John Winthrop called a “city upon a hill,” but we know full well that others abroad see us this way, from those who fear our way of life, the Osama bin Ladens, to those whose own hopes and dreams, extending from people behind the old Iron Curtain to people today living in what we used to call the Third World, have been kept alight because of what we stand for and how we have traditionally comported ourselves in the world. Civil liberties and striking the right balance between security and freedoms at home are part of preserving our ability to be effective abroad. Strength and capacity abroad, therefore, start with what we are at home and what we do. Indeed, is it any wonder that we are still the place chosen for immigration by more people from around the globe than any other? All this is a critical power, influence, and security multiplier.

Three: Assessing Tasks and Priorities

Number three lies in what we decide we have to do in the outside world and what we would like to do in our own self-interest and in terms of our national vocation of helping to build a constantly-improving future for human beings both here and aboard; plus the setting of priorities. Let me suggest several, some in order of priority, some not, given that, with "essentials there can be no priorities."

For the very long term, we now know that America's grand strategy, along with that for the rest of the world, is bound up in getting right the twin challenges of global warming and the environment in general. The great problem, however, is that neither of these challenges, whose course can determine whether a century or so hence we will even have a viable planet on which to deal with other challenges, fits within the time horizon of any political leaderships in any country in the world. One of the greatest demands of grand strategy, therefore, is to find the means to make doing what has to be done about global warming and the environment sufficiently relevant to today that we will act within the time horizon before "relevance" compels political action, but when that may already be too late.

Short of this existential set of requirements, in the next few decades we can already see several grand strategic requirements for US leadership and action, along with friends, allies, and partners. Some have at least in part a geographic quality – especially the rise of China and India and the return of Russia's aspirations to great power status, along with the rise of some other countries to major status and stature in the world. These factors will impose political, economic, and perhaps also military demands. And some emerging grand strategic requirements have a functional quality – increasingly resource scarcity, especially water, hydrocarbons (which also have the most critical impact on the existential challenge of global warming), and arable land, plus the phenomenon that corporately shelters under the term "globalization." The last-named challenge also includes critical factors such as global health -- involving not just the human dimension but also "health as national security" -- education, empowerment of women – a largely-untapped global resource -- job creation, hope creation, good governance, the many effects of migration, and the impact of demographic change and the relative distribution of population by age in different societies and parts of the world – indeed, again as a significant foreign policy and even national security concern.

Even closer to us in terms of time and saliency – although some of the preceding factors are already impacting on requirements for US understanding, leadership, partnerships, and action – are several other factors. These include dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism, not just in directly countering it, but also in acting to "dry up the swamp" within which the recruiting sergeants

of terrorism prosper. They include preventing the further spread of weapons of mass destruction, with priorities of concern along the spectrum of nuclear weapons and weaponizable biologicals – the greatest menacing threats – and then radiological and chemical weapons. Non-proliferation includes not just technical efforts, notably restraining the spread of fissile materials, but also being actively engaged in reducing the national security incentives for countries to "go nuclear." Further, the threat of terrorism, in terms of physical damage as opposed to psychological and political shock, comes mostly from its marriage with weapons of mass destruction, especially at the high end.

Other factors that must be addressed within our new grand strategy must include energy security, not just energy supply and competition, but also rising concerns about assured access, including the possible use of energy supply as a strategic or tactical weapon. They include rising concerns about the integrity of the electro-magnetic space, in particular cyber security. They include dealing with both a short-term and longer-term phenomenon of increased repair by peoples in many parts of the world to negative aspects of identity politics, most notably distortions of a great religion for political ends by a relatively limited numbers of adherents to Islam. And factors to be addressed include specific threats and challenges with a geographic focus, most notably the Middle East, about which I will say more below. Indeed, we need to recognize the need to find a way of reducing our central preoccupation with the Middle East to the exclusion of so much else we must be able to do as part of our overall grand strategy – especially the growing challenges but also opportunities posed by the rise of China and the reemergence of Russia. The Middle East is critical to us; we have no choice but to play our part in crafting a new system of security to replace the one that has been progressively eroded over the last 30 years; but we also have to recognize the dangers of missing "history's bus" in other areas if we cannot reduce the requirements that this one region imposes on our time, attention, resources, and engagement.

A further point: as we focus so much on "new" threats and challenges, we must not mislead ourselves into believing that geopolitics has passed into history. There will be competitions for place and power; not all of these competitors will pursue interests that are compatible with our own. While we explore and adapt to newer challenges, we must not lose the sharp edge of our capacity to deal with more traditional aspects of international politics and potential conflict.

Four: Tools

Issue number four in grand strategy is development of the right tools of foreign policy and national security and the means whereby they will be employed. I have already noted requirements at home for a strong economy and polity. These can be called "indirect" or "basic" tools of security. What we are most concerned about in this hearing, and about which the Armed Services Committee is most

directly concerned, is what can been termed the “direct” tools of security, beginning with military strength.

I will not try here to lay out a comprehensive plan for the resetting and rebuilding of US military forces, nor seek to tell you about which weapons systems to fund or how to structure the US armed forces. That is beyond the scope of this immediate hearing. A central point, however: even if the United States calculates that we will not be called upon in our own self-interest to maintain all the kinds and quantities of high-kinetic, rapidly-deployable forces that we have now and are developing for the future, we will be expected by so many other countries, friends, partners, and allies, to maintain such capabilities, as the provider of military security of last resort. It is not necessary to be able to construct precise scenarios to understand the need for maintaining significant military capabilities and to continue modernizing them. The balance to be struck will be important, of course, but sizeable, modern, and effective US military forces will continue to be a basic underpinning of US grand strategy, even if we do not employ them in conflict.

Let me add a few process points. One, of course, relates to the need to husband resources and to make choices to a degree and intensity that we have not seen for some time. There is very likely to be a topping-out of the growth of military spending, at least in terms of relative growth in uninflated dollars. But that need not necessarily mean a reduction of capacity to act and to promote US interests abroad that include a significant military element of action. Indeed, depending on the evolution of overall US foreign policy and national security, we may well be heading into an era in which the requirements for certain military tools, at least employed on their own, will decline rather than increase – at least military tools needed for action at the high end of the kinetic spectrum. Over time, this will of course depend on what we are able to do in shaping relations with Russia and China, in particular, for the long term; how much we decide there is a need for a high-end military “hedge” against negative developments in relations with China, in particular; the course of arms control, including efforts to prevent the weaponization of space and to work out new arrangements with Russia on strategic and other nuclear weapons; the relative priority to be assigned to (relatively inexpensive) missile defenses; and the specific strategies required to meet US interests in preserving access to the seas and, where need be, sea control.

But as we have been seeing for some time, the demands on lower levels of the kinetic spectrum have been going up in relative terms. Of course, requirements for modernization of C4ISR will continue apace and can even increase. And experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that conflicts that we are most likely to have to face, at least in the years immediately ahead, are likely to place relatively heavy demands on manpower-intensive ground and ground-support forces. We have also learned that some of the more ambitious goals of military transformation during the past decade were miscast, especially the idea that a significant fraction of US military power could

be retained in the United States and then deployed rapidly to far corners of the world. If anything, we have relearned the value of forces that are “forward deployed” in order to create and sustain relationships with indigenous governments, military forces, and peoples that can be critical in enabling projected forces to be effective to the maximum extent and sometimes to be effective at all. This is a power and influence multiplier.

As the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have proceeded and as we look at the potential for similar conflicts elsewhere, including the prosecution of the war on terror, we are facing increasing challenges from what classically is called “asymmetrical warfare.” Of course, almost all warfare, save perhaps for conflicts that are stalemated, are “asymmetrical,” and the task of militaries throughout history has been to try exploiting their own asymmetrical capabilities and methods to achieve success. What we are seeing today, however, is a calculation by a number of enemies of the United States and its friends and allies, many of which enemies are non-state actors. It is an economic and political calculation: to use relatively inexpensive weapons to try defeating our relatively expensive ones; and to try eroding our political will by imposing casualties on US and friendly forces that will be regarded as unacceptable in the politics of our countries. This is not new, historically, including in our experience. In Vietnam, we faced problems of relatively primitive weapons being used against our more expensive and sophisticated weapons: an AK-47 versus a helicopter. And the Tet Offensive was a military defeat for the North Vietnamese but a long-term political and hence strategic success. I will not presume to judge how much of current US domestic debate over Iraq stems from asymmetrical warfare tactics, including IEDs, employed against US forces with a strategic goal to influence attitudes here at home. In general, as well, terror is a weapon with a political purpose, to attempt to affect the willingness of populations to persevere.

In recent years, we have also found in dealing with asymmetrical warfare, in particular, that much of what we have been required to do in order to prevail, in conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is to try influencing “hearts and minds.” In the Cold War, this was an ancillary activity, but now this is a critical purpose of US engagements and that of friends and allies, especially in counterinsurgency (COIN).

At the RAND Corporation, we have just completed a major project, in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomacy, looking at experience, on the ground, in particular situations of military intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In all four of those instances, military forces in theater have found that, in order to prevail, they have had to undertake operations, employ techniques, and bring to bear resources that go far beyond kinetic operations. One technique born of these insights has been the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). In Afghanistan, its use, along with some other techniques, derives from awareness, beginning on the part of US and allied military personnel, that success in Afghanistan will ultimately depend on three

non-military factors in addition to domestic security for the population: governance, reconstruction, and development.

The RAND-AAD project has investigated the lessons learned and best practices of these four conflicts and will soon be issuing a major report. It is about the “integration of instruments of power and influence,” across the board, involving not just the military but also civilian components of the US government, the NATO Alliance, the European Union, and the United Nations, as well as both non-governmental organizations and the private sector. This melding of different instruments of power and influence is proving to be a major “security multiplier.” And, I submit, it contains important lessons for the United States in facing the demands of our emerging grand strategy, involving both conflict situations and post-conflict nation-building, but also in pre-conflict situations to help obviate, where possible, the need for kinetic operations. The United States military has led the effort to draw these lessons. The RAND-AAD project is designed in part to help spread these lessons and best practices across the US government and into our alliances.

They include: systematic planning, beginning at the NSC level; involving the Congress early; engaging from the start all US government agencies likely to be involved in different phases of a military intervention through to nation-building; “purple-suiting” non-military personnel along the lines of Goldwater-Nichols; developing cadres of politically and culturally sensitive personnel with language skills, creating a true “national security budget;” shifting significant resources to non-military activities; creating country-teams involving all relevant US government actors; ending “stove piping” of agencies in the field; devolving major responsibility and resource decisions to the field level; incentivizing long-term service in the field; developing cooperation with institutions like NATO, the EU, and the UN; fostering NATO-EU relations and making best use of Allied Command Transformation; engaging NGOs and the private sector; and in general integrating the tools of power and influence to the best overall effect.

We will be pleased to provide this subcommittee with copies of the report as soon as it is available.

Five: Alliances and Partners

Issue number five in developing a viable grand strategy is the question of what we must do ourselves in pursuit of our own self-interest and in attempting to shape a world that will pose fewer threats and challenges to our security and well-being, and how much can be done by or in cooperation with others. In 1992, I wrote a line for Government Bill Clinton that I believe is a good summary point: “We should act together with others when we can; we should act alone only when we must.”

Earlier in this decade, against a background of substantial US power, especially military power, we tried an experiment of "going it (relatively) alone" in Iraq. I don't want to reopen debate on whether invading Iraq was the right course or not. But I believe one broad conclusion was to revalidate the proposition, which was a central tenet of US foreign policy in the Cold War, about "acting with others when we can." This tenet has now largely been adopted as administration policy and it has been embraced by both presidential candidates. The point is clear: that as a general proposition we will be better served by reemphasizing our alliances rather than by pursuing engagements independent of those alliances.

There have to be qualifiers, of course. This practice can apply only provided we pay heed to the second part of my basic proposition: that we will "act alone when we must." There can be circumstances in which the United States will have to "go it alone," especially if the homeland is directly threatened. It is also true that if we are to ask allies to join with us in pursuit of key elements of our grand strategy, they must also share that perspective. Already, we are finding that difficulty in regard to Afghanistan, as we have asked for European allies to carry an appropriate share of the military burden in the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

At the same time, if we decide that it is in our best interests to engage allies, whether because of what they can "bring to the table" or to show the American people we are not acting alone in circumstances where allies clearly also have much to gain, we will have to be willing to share decision and influence as well as risk and responsibility. In many if not most cases, this limitation on our flexibility to act will be worth accepting. But it will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, with one added proviso: as we have learned over the past 60 years, there is virtue in having alliances in being even if all the allies do not always agree with one another on what is to be done and the means of doing so. NATO, for example, played a major deterrent role in the Cold War simply by existing; and today it plays a major role in the evolution of collective understanding of the degree to which 21st century challenges are emerging to face all of us both beyond Europe and in non-traditional areas, such as energy and cybersecurity.

Working with alliances has value in itself. But it must also be relevant to meeting America's strategic requirements. In recent years, it has become clear that the focus of US interests, especially related to threats, has shifted eastward to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Most of our European allies, by contrast, continue to focus on their own domestic and continental concerns, including the Balkans and uncertainties about Russia's behavior. If we are to ask allies to share our vision of threat and risk beyond Europe – beyond what they should properly see in their own immediate self-interest – we must continue to demonstrate our commitment to be a permanent European power. Some of that comes more-or-less automatically, denominated by the deep entanglement of the North American and European economies with one another. But some must

come with continuing demonstration by the US of Europe's continued strategic importance to us. To that end, it is important that the United States retain substantial military forces in Europe with the US European Command. That is necessary for several reasons: demonstrating US commitment; the effective functioning of Allied Command Operations; training of NATO forces; promoting interoperability; preserving US command slots at SHAPE; and encouraging allies to work with US defense firms. In my judgment, we are already at the low end of the deployments we need in Europe; and plans exist to decrease these deployments further. In my judgment, this would be a profound mistake, affecting our capacity to implement our basic grand strategy. A false economy can become an "influence detractor."

Six: Leadership

Number six goes virtually without saying: that the United States retains an obligation – as well as an opportunity -- for exercising leadership in the world, both in our own self-interest and to meet expectations of friends and allies. But leading is different from insisting that we necessarily have a monopoly of the truth or that others must necessarily follow. Having said that, it is clear that there is no other country or set of countries that is able to rival the United States in "doing the right thing" in terms of building institutions and practices that will add to the sum of global security and advance. Economically, the US economy remains preeminent; and so too does the responsibility imposed on the United States, in both public and private sectors, to tend to the effective workings of the global economy. During World War II, the United States led in providing both the vision and the actions to create the great institutions that made possible the management of economies in many parts of the world that have benefited countless millions of people. Today, we continue to have a lead, but not sole, responsibility for the continual reform of economic institutions and practices, both public and private, that will are essential to preserve and extend our own interests, those of allies and partners, and a functioning global economic system that in itself is a critical aspect of "security," properly understood.

There will be an added economic requirement, of course, both in our own and a corporate self-interest: the reform and adaptation of existing institutions so that more countries and peoples will be able to profit from them and from the global economy. The age of rapid mobility and instant communications will also be an age in which classic divisions between haves and have-nots will no longer be sustainable to the same degree as in the past, if at all. The United States must be in the lead here, as well. Indeed, further institution building needs to remain a major charge on US grand strategy, as a security, power, and influence multiplier.

I would like to say that other countries, especially in the Western world, are ready to exercise their own proper share of global leadership. So far, this is not true, even though institutions like the

European Union – the non-hostile potential "regional hegemon" that has also been fostered by the United States – has the potential for moving in that direction. In economics, it is progressively stepping up to the mark. In terms of security it still lags behind, even though European allies make critical contributions to the effective functioning of the NATO alliance in all of its activities and the EU has been developing the institutions of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP). Some observers in the United States have been ambivalent about these institutions and the pretensions of the European Union to exert greater foreign policy influence. I have long believed that these concerns are miscast. No one has ever discerned any circumstance in which the EU states would want to undertake a military mission to which the United States would object: there is that degree of strategic compatibility, despite occasional areas of difference and disagreement about what we should be doing together. CFSP and ESDP have a further value that impacts directly on our own interests and fits within the new US grand strategy for the future: they provide an added impetus for the Europeans to spend resources on defense and to take defense and security issues seriously, and this "value added" is a further security multiplier for the United States. The extension of the NATO Alliance to create new partnerships with other countries, beginning with the landmark Partnership for Peace but now including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea, serves a similar function that adds to our own storehouse of security.

In addition, in trying to shape developments and events in the world and especially in areas that had been termed the Third World, the United States, Canada, the European Union states, and others like Japan dispose of the great bulk of capacity for positive impact and action. Democracies all, effectively governed, with highly-developed economies, strong health and education sectors, and moral and practical commitments to development and poverty-reduction in less well-off societies, collectively their potential for action is immense. To begin with, the United States, Canada, and the European Union should forge a new transatlantic strategic partnership in areas of activity that can be mobilized to promote human development – in the Middle East, Africa, parts of Latin America and Asia -- that, in itself, can be instrumental in reducing the risks of conflict and, as noted above, drying up support for terrorism.

Seven: Popular Support

Finally, issue number seven in the development and implementation of a new US grand strategy is "buy-in" by the American people. I believe it is important to restate the basic wisdom of the American people in assessing the national self interest and also in undertaking risks and responsibilities when that is necessary. When there is clear and intelligent purpose in what we do abroad, the American people have proved steadfast: Many a dictator has discovered that the United States can be an implacable foe! But there are some requirements. I have learned in my

years of engagement in US foreign policy and national security that the American people will support potential costs in blood and treasure from military engagement abroad, for a substantial period, only if three requirements are met: that what the United States is doing comports with our interests as a nation, that it is consistent with our values, and that there is a reasonable prospect of success, call it victory. When that is true, as in World War II, the American nation does not waver. When it is not true in all of its particulars, then popular support tends to crumble over time. Obviously, there will be circumstances in which these three qualities are not immediately evident and in which we still very much need to act, and political leadership will be sorely tested to gain the needed political support – Franklin Roosevelt's preparation of the nation for inevitable engagement in World War II is a prominent case in point. By contrast, in Somalia we had a values-driven, humanitarian interest in engagement, but no US strategic interest was at stake, or a prospect that long-term involvement would achieve success. I can personally attest that, in the Clinton administration, it was clear that using military force to end the Bosnia war was in the US interest and comported with our values, to help stop the worst fighting and atrocities in Europe since World War II. But the "interest" was only indirect; everyone agreed that no matter what happened in Bosnia, there would be no wider war in Europe. What was at stake, after NATO was modernized to end the possibility of another conflict across the Continent, was the reputation and hence the viability of the Alliance itself. The same was true of the European Union. But this was not something that a president could take to the American people as a cause for risking American lives in combat. Thus a critical aspect of US and NATO strategy in using military force to end the Bosnia war was to do it almost entirely with air power. Indeed, remarkably victory was achieved in NATO operations, as was also the case later in stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo, without a single US or allied combat fatality.

Lessons here are both clear and direct: US leaders need to explain their thinking about the outside world and their perception of the proper place of the United States in it to the American people, fully and in candor. They must also make the case to our fighting men and women why their lives are being put at risk, why their sacrifice, for some including the ultimate sacrifice, is worthwhile and necessary to the Nation. Efforts to mislead the American people or to pursue policies that have little grounding in the most important twin requirements, interests and values, can succeed for a time; but in the end they will fail, at loss of credibility for leadership and in some cases for US standing abroad. We have faced such a situation in the last few years, during which the credibility of US leadership and our standing in the world, in terms both of morality and also competence, has suffered grievously. Errors of judgment can be tolerated: they happen to all of us; crying "wolf" carries a high price and eventually will be revealed. The Congress of course has major responsibilities in this regard, for ferreting out the truth and for adding its own constitutionally-mandated judgments.

Being able to secure the support of the American people for what we do abroad is the ultimate security, power, and influence builder, and it must continue to be a critical, even preeminent, element of US grand strategy.

Grand Strategy for the Middle East

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude with some observations about the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the geographic area in which the United States is now most deeply engaged militarily, where we are fighting two wars, from whence threats to the homeland have more recently emanated, and which is imposing critical demands on US engagement, understanding, intelligence, and leadership.

I would submit that, nearly seven years after 9/11 and more than five years after the invasion of Iraq, we are still grappling for an overall grand strategy for this region. On a set of issues so immense and complex, I will not try to offer detailed recommendations but rather a few general observations.

There can be no doubt that the different elements of this region are linked inextricably together. It will not be possible to resolve conflict or challenge in any one part without simultaneously addressing all the rest. Partial understanding and piecemeal actions will not suffice and cannot produce lasting success. I believe that several propositions need to be considered:

As the US decreases its involvement in Iraq, we must preserve our reputation for the exercise of power and influence, reliability in engagements and in relations with countries friendly to us. This is not Vietnam, where withdrawal had few lasting consequences because we were at the same time doing what had to be done, and what we were expected to do by allies and friends, in containing the Soviet Union. How we reduce our engagement in Iraq, what situation emerges there, and how we continue a US presence and sense of purpose in the region will be critical, not least for the US reputation in the region and beyond for knowing our own interests and pursuing them. US reliability is a precious asset and a critical element of our grand strategy.

The United States continues to be locked in a form of confrontation with Iran. We and others are resolute in opposing its potential acquisition of nuclear weapons and in seeking an end to its support for terrorism and its meddling in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, the continued presence and role of Iran in the Persian Gulf, as a lesser but still consequential power, is a fact of life. The US reduction of engagement in Iraq would be greatly facilitated by Iranian cooperation or at least not negative interference. Success in Afghanistan would be greatly aided by a return to the cooperation between Iran and Western forces that characterized the time of the intervention to

overthrow the Taliban. While we continue to have no formal relations with Iran, while it continues to take positions, not least on Israel, that we find obnoxious, at the same time in our own self-interest we need to pursue what is possible with that country. Fortunately, the administration is now tentatively doing something that it should long since have done, exploring the possibility of direct talks. But we are still not prepared to contemplate a sine qua non: to be prepared, if Iran does what we want and need it to do regarding nuclear and other issues, to provide it with guarantees of its own security. Our unwillingness to do this has ensured that all diplomacy with Iran, including that conducted by European states, would fail. If we reversed course on this one obvious point, however – something that we long since did with North Korea – Iran might or might not respond positively. If it did, we could begin the process of seeing whether a tolerable relationship could be developed over time, recognizing that we will continue to resist any Iranian pretensions to hegemony, as we ourselves remain the preeminent power in the Persian Gulf region. And if they did not respond, then we would be in a far better position than we have been to approach allies and others for support in confronting an obdurate Iranian regime. This is a matter of high policy, approaching grand strategy, and we finally need to pursue our own self-interest in a potentially stable Persian Gulf, not to pursue the wishful thinking of reducing all competitors for power and influence in the region to impotence.

Afghanistan is the other major element of challenge and uncertainty in the region. Perhaps the NATO Alliance should not have made the sweeping commitment that it did to achieving success in that country. It has done so; and Afghanistan must not become the first and only place where NATO has ever failed. It is too much to say that the future of the Alliance will stand or fall on what happens in Afghanistan, but the commitment is clear and it must be honored. It is in major part a military commitment, and the United States has made clear that it will need added efforts by European allies, including more forces, more equipment, and fewer caveats. But for political reasons, including the fact that many of the allies and their popular opinion do not see a direct connection between what happens in Afghanistan and their own national security and well-being, the desired European responses will almost surely not be forthcoming to the degree that we want. At the same time, all indications are, and all expert and military opinion agrees, that the principal long-term key to success in Afghanistan will likely lie, as I noted above, in governance, reconstruction, and development. European allies, including the European Union as an institution, should be providing far greater resources and engagement than they have so far done, just as non-security agencies of the US government need to be far more deeply engaged than they have been. This emphasis on the complementarity and integration of instruments of power and influence will be critical to success in Afghanistan, and it should have a high priority in US and allied efforts.

There are other elements of Middle East policy that must be tackled as part of an overarching grand strategy. These include Pakistan, the locus of so much of the threat to Afghan and Western

efforts in Afghanistan; indeed, Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan are different from our own and may not be compatible. Other elements include energy supply, where assured access is a derivative of success in other aspects of Middle East polity. They include Turkey, where US standing in recent years had fallen to historic lows and where internal difficulties are as challenging as any faced by that country since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They include Lebanon, where peace has yet to catch hold, and where external powers continue to practice confrontation by proxy. They include Syria, where there could be promise of creating a viable relationship with Israel. They include seeking an end to support by Saudi nationals for activities in other countries that promote terrorism. And they include the prosecution of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, itself a central requirement for success in the Middle East overall. To be sure, even complete peace and total acceptance of Israel by all its Arab neighbors would not end conflict and strife elsewhere. But success in the Israel-Palestine peace process is important both to secure support from European allies we need elsewhere in the region and to help reduce opposition to US efforts elsewhere. Israel's security must not be compromised; but US engagement in peacemaking has long since ceased to be a choice and has become an inescapable obligation. And the United States, along with NATO allies, should be prepared to inject peacekeeping forces, if requested, into an independent Palestinian state at peace with Israel.

For the long term, the United States faces a further need. It is not at all clear that the American people will tolerate an open-ended US commitment to be engaged militarily in conflict in the region, expending blood and treasure, especially if there is "no end in sight." Nor is it clear that the continued, highly-visible presence of US forces in particular countries will make a positive rather than negative contribution to overall security and stability in the region. It is also clear that requirements in the Middle East, in part thrust upon us by the nature of the region, in part by our becoming the unfortunate legatees of British and French colonialism, and in part by some of our own choices, detract from our ability to put time and effort and resources into dealing with some other developments in the world that in time will be of great consequence, central to our grand strategy: especially the rise of China and India and the reemergence of Russia. The Middle East is a distortion of perspective, and we need to find some way of decreasing its importance in the degree and depth of our involvement there.

In particular, the United States needs to start devising a long-term strategy for the region that includes the development, over time, of a new security structure for the region that could, in time, enable the United States to take a step back and, as was pursued three decades ago, revert as much as possible to an "over the horizon presence" but one that is readily available for reinsertion in military and other terms. Such a new security structure needs to be based on several principals: that all regional countries will be able to take part, if they are prepared to subscribe to a common definition of shared security; that creation of such a structure needs, from the outset, to involve

roles for all the potential future participants; that the United States and European allies will continue to be engaged, certainly as ultimate guarantors of security; and that economic, political, and social development will be a major part of the structure. Such a new, region-wide security structure cannot be wished into being. It would take years if not decades to develop. It must be premised on the willingness of the United States and allies to remain deeply engaged in the region. But in the very pursuit of such a structure and the political relationships that would accompany it, the United States would be able to present to the American people a goal to be achieved that would not just mean that the US would have to take open-ended responsibility for all that happens in the region. It would also start a process that could, in time, begin to refocus US attention to a global canvas with other elements that will have a critical impact on our future.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee, today.